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Résumé 
Cet article examine les relations qui puissent exister entre les caractéristiques de la structure de 
propriété et du conseil d’administration dans un échantillon de 260 banques commerciales et banques-
caisses d’épargne. Ces caractéristiques de gouvernance, destinées à réduire les problèmes d’agence 
entre actionnaires et dirigeants, sont la participation des dirigeants dans le capital, la participation 
d’actionnaires majoritaires dans le capital, la proportion des administrateurs externes, la structure de 
leadership du conseil d’administration, et la taille du conseil d’administration. Utilisant la méthode des 
doubles moindres carrés, nous présentons des résultats qui favorisent l’idée selon laquelle les banques 
substituent entre les différents mécanismes de gouvernance qui alignent les intérêts des actionnaires et 
dirigeants. Ces résultats suggèrent que les régressions par les moindres carrés ordinaires (MCO) de 
mesures de la performance bancaire sur des mécanismes individuels de gouvernance peuvent induire 
en erreur. En effet, les estimations révèlent qu’il y a des relations statistiquement significatives entre la 
performance et la participation des dirigeants et des actionnaires majoritaires dans le capital lorsque 
les MCO sont utilisés. Cependant, ces relations statistiquement significatives disparaissent lorsque le 
cadre de travail des équations simultanées est utilisé. Ensemble, ces résultats suggèrent que les 




This paper examines the interrelations among five ownership and board characteristics in a 
sample of 260 bank and savings-and-loan holding companies. These governance characteristics, 
designed to reduce agency problems between shareholders and managers, are insider ownership, 
blockholder ownership, the proportion of outside directors, board leadership structure, and board size.  
Using two-stage least squares regressions, we present evidence of interdependencies between board 
and ownership structures. The results suggest that banks substitute between governance mechanisms 
that align the interests of managers and shareholders. These findings suggest that cross-sectional OLS 
regressions of bank performance on single governance mechanisms may be misleading. Indeed, we 
find statistically significant relationships between performance and insider ownership and blockholder 
ownership when using OLS regressions. However, these statistically significant relationships 
disappear when the simultaneous equations framework is used. Together, these findings are consistent 
with optimal use of each governance mechanism by banks.     
 
Keywords : Corporate governance, board structure, ownership structure, performance, banking, 
simultaneous equations. 
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  1  1.  Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership and control in publicly held corporations induces 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Shareholders are interested in maximizing the value of the firm, but managers’ objectives 
may also include the increase of perquisite consumption and job security. A number of 
governance mechanisms may help to align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. This includes equity ownership by managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
by outside blockholders (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) and executive compensation 
(Mehran, 1995). In addition the board of directors may play a central role in monitoring 
managers (Fama, 1980). Board size, board composition and the leadership structure of 
the board are important characteristics that affect the effectiveness of the board in 
monitoring management (Jensen, 1993).  
 
The role of ownership structure (Morck et al., 1988 , and McConnell and Servaes, 
1990) and board structure (Baysinger and Butler, 1985 ; Rechner and Dalton, 1991 ; 
Yermack, 1996, Eisenberg et al., 1998, and Bhagat and Black, 2002) in monitoring 
management and so improving firm performance has been largely investigated in 
empirical corporate governance literature. While the results are mixed the approach used 
in studying the relation between governance mechanisms and firm performance is mostly 
the same.  Underlying these studies on the effect of ownership and board structure on 
performance is the assumption that there is an optimal ownership and board structure 
which is common to all firms, and that firms which diverge from the optimal level of 
these characteristics will experience lower performance.   
 
The alternative view is that several governance mechanisms, among which 
ownership structure and board structure, are available at the same time, and that they are 
endogenously determined according to the costs and benefits of each. The costs and 
benefits of each governance mechanism may vary across firms, making the use of one 
more attractive to one firm than to another. Each mechanism will be thus used by each 
firm up to a level where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Consequently, 
optimal corporate governance structures vary across firms, and result in equally good 
performance. Under this view there will possibly be no empirical relationship between 
ownership and board structure and performance. Studies that have adopted this approach 
include Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) investigation of the determinants of ownership 
concentration, Himmelberg et al.’s (1999) examination of the determinants of managerial 
ownership, Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1991) investigation of the interaction between 
board composition and insider ownership and their effect on performance, and Cho’s 
(1998) study of the interactions between managerial ownership, investment and corporate 
value. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Mak and Li (2001) adopt the same approach but 
work with a more complete set of governance mechanisms.  
 
In banking, this approach has been adopted by a number of authors, among whom 
Schranz (1993) and Booth et al. (2002) who look at the effect of the presence of 
regulation in the banking industry on the use of other corporate control mechanisms, 
designed to provide managers with incentives to maximize firm value. Schranz (1993) 
  2  looks at the effect of the restriction of takeover activity in some states on the use of other 
corporate control mechanisms, such as the concentration of equity ownership and 
management ownership of stock, and on firm performance. Using a simultaneous 
equations framework she finds that when takeover activity is restricted, banks have 
higher levels of managerial ownership and equity concentration. Nevertheless, higher 
levels of managerial ownership and equity concentration have a smaller effect on 
profitability and do not completely compensate for the absence of an active takeover 
market. Booth et al. (2002) study the effect of regulation on the role of internal 
monitoring mechanisms such as the presence of independent outside directors, 
managerial stock ownership and the separation of the chairman and CEO titles. They find 
that in regulated industries such as banking the interrelations among internal governance 
mechanisms are not as strong as in industrial firms. They interpret this as evidence that 
regulation serves as a substitute for internal monitoring mechanisms. However, their 
analysis suffers from a simultaneity bias since they recognize the simultaneous 
determination of the different internal corporate control mechanisms but do not control 
for it in their empirical analysis.     
 
The present study continues the above line of research by investigating the 
interrelations among a number of corporate control mechanisms and with firm 
performance in a sample of U.S bank (BHC) and savings-and-loan holding companies 
(SLHC). It adds to studies such as Schranz and Booth et al. in two ways. First, contrary to 
both studies we work with a more complete set of governance variables, which relate to 
board and ownership structure. In this respect, our study compares more to Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Mak and Li (2001). Second, we use a data set from a recent period; 
the year 2002. This allows us to examine the trade offs between corporate control 
mechanisms and their effect on performance when banks face the same external 
disciplinary mechanisms nation wide. Recently the banking industry has undergone 
important changes that shifted the business environment of banking firms to a more 
competitive one. Deregulation that started in the 1980s, and continued in the middle of 
the 1990s with the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching, made banks less 
protected by expanding the market for corporate control. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
which became effective in 2000, increased competition on the product market and 
expanded the banking opportunity set by broadening the range of activities banks can 
engage in. All these changes unified the market for corporate control and the market for 
financial services, and led banks to operate under the same “threats” nation wide. 
Consequently, governance mechanisms such as the board of directors and ownership 
structure are expected to play a more active role in aligning managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders. Working with data from a recent period allows to neutralize the 
effect of regulation, regarding the takeover market and the product market, on the choice 
of the other corporate control mechanisms by banks. Since the intensity of these external 
mechanisms became the same for all banks, we can get a better insight on how the latter 
design their ownership and board structures in order to reduce the manager/shareholder 
agency problem.  
 
In order to examine the interrelations of board and ownership variables and their 
possible effect on firm performance we work on a sample of 260 bank and savings-and-
  3  loan holding companies. We use a simultaneous equations framework and test for two 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that banks substitute between the different 
corporate control mechanisms designed to reduce the agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders (the substitution hypothesis). The second hypothesis states that banks 
use the different corporate control mechanisms in an optimal way, depending on the costs 
and benefits of each. If this is the case an empirical analysis that takes into account the 
endogeneity of corporate control mechanisms should reveal no relation between them and 
firm performance (the optimal use of governance mechanisms hypothesis).  
  
The findings of this paper indicate that there are interrelations among board and 
ownership structures of banking firms. Banks with higher equity ownership by managers 
and directors (insiders) have a lower proportion of outside directors sitting on their board. 
Since both outside directors and insider ownership are both considered as mechanisms 
designed to mitigate the manager/shareholder agency problem, we interpret this as 
evidence that banks substitute between corporate control mechanisms intended to 
accomplish the same role. The results indicate also that banks with higher insider 
ownership have a lower probability to have a CEO who is also the chairman of the board. 
Consistent with the “passing the baton” hypothesis suggested in earlier studies we find 
that CEOs with a longer tenure are more likely to hold the chairman title. The findings 
are also in favor of the optimal use of governance mechanisms hypothesis. An OLS 
regression of the set of governance mechanisms on firm performance, as measured by the 
Tobin’s Q, reveals a negative and statistically significant effect of insider and 
blockholder ownership on bank performance. However, when the Two stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) procedure is used these statistically significant effects disappear. Overall 
the results of this study show that corporate ownership and board structures of banking 
firms are inextricably linked and that banks use optimal levels of each governance 
mechanism.     
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some possible 
directions for the interrelations among governance mechanisms and with firm 
performance. Section 3 introduces the empirical approach used to study the relationships 
among the governance mechanisms. Section 4 introduces the sample and provides 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the results, and section 6 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.  
 
  2. Relationships among governance mechanisms and with firm performance 
 
Several governance mechanisms work together to provide incentives to managers 
and, so, alleviate the agency problems between shareholders and managers resulting from 
the separation between ownership and control. This includes what is called the internal 
control system, composed mainly by the board of directors, who has the task to hire, 
reward, potentially fire managers, and to design the system of incentives for them. It 
includes also the external governance mechanisms, such as the product market, the 
market for corporate control, the presence of concentrated shareholdings by persons or 
institutions, the labor market for managers, and the capital market, whenever the 
company relies partly on debt. An empirical analysis focused on companies belonging to 
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mechanisms have the same effect on all companies, at least of a certain size, in the 
industry. For instance the intensity of the market for corporate control and the 
competitiveness of the labor market for managers and of the product market are common 
to all banks. Thus focusing mainly on internal governance mechanisms, in a single 
industry, may give a better idea of the interrelations among internal governance 
mechanisms and their potential effect on performance.  This study is mainly focused on 
the interrelations among internal governance mechanisms in banking firms. Nevertheless, 
blockholder ownership is included as a governance mechanism, since its extent varies 
from one bank to another even when the other external mechanisms are common to all 
banks. The internal governance mechanisms are the equity ownership by officers and 
directors (insider ownership), the proportion of outside directors, the duality of leadership 
structure
1, and the number of directors sitting on the board (board size). 
 
2.1. Manager and director ownership 
 
Managers and directors whose personal wealth is significantly linked to the value of 
the firm will have the incentive to act in the interests of outside shareholders. According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976) if outside shareholders can costlessly assess the extent to 
which an owner-manager imposes agency costs on other shareholders, the market value 
of the firm’s stock will be reduced, decreasing therefore the owner’s wealth. The 
corporate governance literature argues that increasing stock ownership by managers and 
directors can be an effective control mechanism designed to reduce the moral hazard 
behavior of firm managers. If this is an effective control mechanism, then an increase in 
the extent of its use would induce a reduction in the level of other monotoring 
mechanisms such as the presence of blockholders and outside directors.  
 
2.2. Blockholder ownership 
 
The presence of shareholders holding a high proportion of the firm’s capital 
constitutes another way to mitigate the effects of the separation of ownership and control 
on firm value. The manager of a firm in which each shareholder holds only a small 
fraction of the firm’s capital can engage in value reducing activities (Berle and Means, 
1932). Indeed a shareholder with a little stake in the firm has weak incentives to engage 
in the monitorong of managers since he or she supports all the costs of minitoring while 
getting only a small fraction of the benefits (the typical free rider problem).  In contrast, 
an ownership structure in which one or more shareholders own a large block of stock has 
the potential for refuting managers from engaging in moral hazard behavior. The 
presence of blockholders may represent a threat to the company’s management because 
of the power to launch a proxy fight, or in the extreme, a takeover bid. A blockholder 
may also nominate a person to represent him or her on the board of directors, in order to 
ensure that management is acting in the interests of shareholders. Consequently, firms 
with blockholder ownership are expected to have less agency problems, and the need for 
alternative control mechanisms is reduced.  
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper “duality of leadership structure” refers to the situation where the CEO holds the 
title of the chairman of the board.  
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Another mechanism designed to mitigate the moral hazard behavior of managers is 
monitoring by the board of directors. Most corporate charters require that shareholders 
elect a board of directors, whose mission is to monitor management and assist in strategic 
planning within the firm. Most importantly, for the board to be effective in carrying out 
its task of management monitoring it has to be independent of the management team. 
Therefore, it is argued by a number of academicians and professionals that the presence 
of directors who are not employees of the firm may enhance the effetiveness of the board 
of directors in monitoring managers, and improving firm value. The rationale behind this 
is that outside directors are more likely to defend the interests of outside shareholders. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors have the incentive to act as monitors 
of management because they want to protect their reputations as effective, independent 
decision makers. Weisbach (1988) finds that outside-dominated boards are more likely 
than inside-dominated boards to replace the CEO in response to poor performance. In 
banking, the results regarding the effectiveness of outside directors are mixed. Brewer III 
et al. (2000) find that bid premiums offered for target banks increase with the proportion 
of independent outside directors. However, Pi and Timme (1993) and Adams and Mehran 
(2002) find that the proportion of outside directors is not related to performance 
measures. Since the presence of outside directors entails costs to the firm, that take the 
form of fees, travel expenses, stocks and stock-options, we would expect that banks will 
use higher numbers of outside directors only when the other corporate control 
mechanisms are weak.   
 
2.4. CEO-Chairman duality 
 
       Many shareholder activits and corporate governence scholars consider that separating 
the titles of chairman and CEO will reduce agency costs and improve firm performance. 
The reason is that when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, the power within the 
firm is concentrated in one person’s hands. This allows the CEO to control information 
available to other board members. The board becomes under the control of managers, 
which prevents it from effectively accomplishing  its tasks of hiring, eventually firing, 
and rewarding top executive officers, and to ratify and monitor important decisions.   
Given the decrease in the effectivenes of the board, the potential agency costs resulting 
from the separation of ownership and decision making are exacerbated. Jensen (1993) 
recommends that companies separate the titles of CEO and board chairman. Pi and 
Timme (1993) study a sample of banks over the 1987 – 1990 period. Their results suggest 
that after controlling for bank size and other control variables, costs are lower and return 
on assets are higher in banks with two different persons holding the CEO and chairman 
titles. Control mechanisms designed to mitigate the agency problem are therefore 
expected to be used to a larger extent in companies operating with a dual leadership 
structure.   
 
2.5. Board of directors’ size 
 
        The largely shared wisdom regarding the optimal board size is that the higher the 
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that communication, coordination of tasks, and decision making effectiveness among a 
large group of people is harder and costlier than it is in smaller groups. The costs 
overwhelm the advantages gained from having more people to draw on. Jensen (1993) 
states that “Keeping boards small can help improve their performance. When boards get 
beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for 
the CEO to control.” (p. 865) Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also call for adoption of small 
boards, and recommend that board size be limited to seven or eight members. A number 
of empirical studies have documented a negative effect of board size on firm performance 
(Yeramck, 1996 and Eisenberg et al., 1998). Therefore corporate mechanisms such as 
insider and blockholder ownership, and the presence of high proportions of outside 
directors become more important in firms with large boards.  
 
2.6. The effect on firm performance 
 
          The  classical  argument  about the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and firm performance is that, for some variables, the greater the level of the 
variable and the better is firm performance; the opposite holds for other variables. 
Consider for instance, stock ownership by insiders and blockholders.  The largely shared 
wisdom, about these two control mechanisms, is that firms with more insider ownership 
and blokholder ownership achieve a better performance. The same argument holds for the 
presence of outside directors on  the board, i.e., the more outside directors the firm has on 
its board the better is its performance. Regarding the size of the board, a number of 
academicians and professionals call for smaller boards of directors, based either on 
intuition or empirical findings. The rationale behind this is that the effectiveness of larger 
boards is lower, and firms will gain, in terms of performance, if they choose to operate 
with boards composed of a limited number of directors.  
 
However, another argument consists to say that each corporate control mechanism 
generates benefits to the firm but also entails costs. Therefore, a corporate control 
mechanism will be used up to a level where the marginal benefits equal the marginal 
costs. Most importantly, the optimal levels of the different control mechanisms may vary 
across frims, yielding different levels of use of each mechanism but with equally good 
performance. In addition to the optimal use of each corporate control mechanism, a 
number of these mechanisms are designed to achieve the same objective, which is to 
reduce the extent of the moral hazard behavior by managers. Consequently, higher levels 
of the use of one mechanism may induce lower levels of the use of other mechanisms, 
without having a negative effect on firm performance. According to this argument, a 
cross sectional analysis would not yield any significant relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance, all other things being equal.    
    
2.7. Hypotheses 
 
Since all of the governance mechanisms we described above are alternative ways to 
provide incentives to managers, each might plausibly be used instead of another. If so, we 
would expect the use of the different mechanisms to be related to each other.  Depending 
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instance banks with higher levels of insider ownership would have less blockholders and 
less outsider directors. Likewise, banks with higher insider ownership, blockholders or 
higher proportions of outside directors would have less of a need for smaller boards or 
the separation of the CEO and chair titles. Accordingly, the first hypothesis to be tested in 
this paper is the substitution hypothesis: 
  
H1: Banks substitute between the alternative governance mechanisms. That is banks with 
heavy use of one mechanism will use lower levels of the other mechanisms.  
  
We also argued that firms choose the level of their corporate governance 
mechanisms in a way that maximizes performance. That is the different corporate 
governance mechanisms are used in an optimal way. Therefore, the second hypothesis to 
be tested in this paper is the optimal use of governance mechanisms hypothesis: 
  
H2: Banks use the governance mechanisms in an optimal way. That is any cross sectional 
variation in their use reflect differences in the costs and benefits of each mechanism 
between banks. These differences in costs and benefits are themselves due to external 
factors, such as the business environment of the bank. Consequently, if these differences 
are controlled for, or if mechanism use is unrelated to the environment, there should be 
no cross-sectional relation between the level of the use of corporate governance 
mechanisms and measures of firm performance.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
         The choice of any of the five ownership and board variables may depend upon 
choices of other ownership and board variables, and other factors related to the bank’s 
underlying environment. These factors are related to bank size, bank age, and CEO 
characteristics and are treated as exogenous variables. To develop the system of 
equations, we draw on previous studies that have examined the determinants of 
ownership and board structure of firms (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 ; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996 ; Cho, 1998, Himmelberg et al., 1999, and Mak and Li, 2001).  
 
There are five equations in the system of equations for ownership and board 
structure. The endogenous variables in the system of equations are insider ownership 
(INSOWN), blockholder ownership (BLOCK), the proportion of outside directors 
(OUTDIR), board leadership (LEADER), and board size (BSIZE)
2. In estimating the 
system of equations, the following variables are used as instruments: RISK, TENURE, 
LNCSIZE
3, RETURN, AGE, NINS, NYSE, and SLHC
4, where RISK is the standard 
                                                 
2 The definition of the variables used in the study is given in table 1 in the appendix.   
3 In all the estimations the distribution of bank size (CSIZE) is normalized by using its natural logarithm, 
LNCSIZE.  
4 To satisfy the order condition, ensuring that the equations in the system are identified, each equation must 
exclude at least four of the exogenous variables since each equation includes four endogenous variables as 
regressors (Kennedy, 1998). The specification of equations (1) – (5) is partly driven by the need to satisfy 
this order condition.   
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chief executive officer, LNCSIZE is the natural logarithm of the company’s size, 
RETURN is the average monthly stock return over the last twenty-four months, AGE is 
the number of years since the bank has been organized as a holding company, NINS is 
the number of top executive officers and directors in the bank, NYSE is a dummy 
variable that takes on 1 if the bank is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 0 
otherwise, and SHLC is a dummy variable that takes on 1 if the bank is a savings-and-
loan holding company and 0 otherwise.    
 
Consider the first equation in the system which relates to insider ownership 
(INSOWN). We expect INSOWN to depend not only on the levels of the other corporate 
governance mechanisms but also on other factors, such as the riskiness of the bank, its 
size and the number of persons holding these stock shares. Bank risk may impact insider 
ownership in two different ways. On the one hand, higher insider ownership levels, all 
else being equal, imply less diversification for insiders. Consequently, for risk averse 
managers and directors, the greater is the riskiness of the bank’s stock return the lower is 
the optimal level of stock ownership. On the other hand, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) offer 
another explanation for the relation between firm risk and managerial ownership. They 
argue that a higher volatility of the stock returns may be considered as a signal for the 
higher noisiness of a firm’s activity and environment. For such firms managerial behavior 
is more difficult to monitor. Therefore, firms operating in noisier environments should 
have higher insider ownership in order to limit the moral hazard behavior by managers. 
Similar to risk, bank size has an ambiguous effect on the scope for moral hazard and 
therefore on insider ownership. One argument leads to expect a positive association 
between bank size and insider ownership. According to this argument larger banks hold 
more opaque assets, increasing the scope for managers to engage in value reducing 
activities. The cost of monitoring in larger banks is higher, which increases the optimal 
level of insider ownership.  
 
The other argument is that larger banks are the subject of more monitoring and 
control by regulators, reducing therefore the scope for moral hazard behavior by 
managers. This will, in turn, lead to a lower optimal level of insider ownership in larger 
banks. Besides, for a given fraction of ownership, investing in one firm’s capital requires 
more wealth the larger is the firm. Risk aversion implies that the larger the firm and the 
lower is the proportion of the firm’s capital held by insiders. INSOWN should be 
positively related to the number of officers and directors, denoted NINS. Indeed the cost 
of insider shareholdings, resulting from under-diversified portfolios, will be less when 
these shares are divided among a larger number of insiders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996). SLHC is included as an exogenous variable in all the equations since the 
governance structure may be determined differently in Savings and Loan Holding 
Companies
5. We therefore have the following model:  
 
                                                 
5 Our results are qualitatively the same when we consider only the sample of bank holding companies 
(BHC).   
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1 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
  SLHC α NINS α RISK α
LNCSIZE α BSIZE α LEADER α OUTDIR α BLOCK α α INSOWN
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
The second equation in the system relates to blockholder ownership (BLOCK). 
Similar to eq (1) we include the four other board and ownership variables as explanatory 
variables, and we add other exogenous variables which we think determine the extent of 
stock ownership by blockholders. We define BLOCK as the percentage of equity owned 
by persons and institutions holding 5 % or more of the company’s equity. BLOCK may 
be affected by RISK and LNCSIZE in the same way as INSOWN. Indeed the same 
arguments discussed above are valid for the extent of ownership concentration within 
outside shareholders’ hands. Following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) we also include 
NYSE to control for the possibility that BLOCK depends on whether the bank is listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange or not. In particular, institutional investors may be 
attracted by banks listed on the NYSE (see also Himmelberg et al., 1999 for a similar 
argument). So, NYSE should be positively related to BLOCK. Summarizing, we have: 
 
.   SLHC   NYSE   RISK   LNCSIZE   BSIZE  
LEADER   OUTDIR   INSOWN     BLOCK
2 8 7 6 5 4
3 2 1 0
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
                        (2) 
 
The proportion of outside directors is expected to be positively related to LNCSIZE. 
Larger banks have more opaque assets and operations which require higher monitoring of 
managers. One way to improve the monitoring of management is to have more outside 
directors sitting on the board. Furthermore, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that the 
greater visibility of large firms may induce more board seats devoted to representatives of 
the public, for example consumer or environmental interests. Based on results by Baghat 
and Black (2002), who find that in the aftermath of poor performance, companies tend to 
add more outside directors to their boards, OUTDIR is expected to be negatively related 
to past performance (RETURN). Therefore, we have:  
 
                   (3) 
.   SLHC   RETURN   LNCSIZE  
BSIZE   LEADER   BLOCK   INSOWN     OUTDIR
3 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
+ + + +
+ + + + =
 
LEADER is a dummy variable that takes on 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and 0 otherwise. Based on empirical work by Brickley et al. (1997), LEADER is 
expected to be positively related to both TENURE and RETURN. Brickley et al. report 
that a CEO who performs well, and who has served for a long time within the company is 
likely to be granted the title of chairman of the board.  Therefore, we have: 
 
                          (4)  
.   SLHC φ TENURE φ RETURN φ
BSIZE φ OUTDIR φ BLOCK φ INSOWN φ φ LEADER
4 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
+ + + +
+ + + + =
 
The last endogenous variable related to corporate control is board size. Yermack 
(1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) report a positive correlation between board size and 
the total assets of the firm, implying that larger companies have larger boards. Indeed as 
  10  the bank gets larger the number and complexity of its operations increases, requiring 
therefore more directors to rely on. We also expect board size to be positively related to 
the number of years since the bank has been organized as a holding company (AGE). The 
reason is that as time goes on more managers are promoted to directors, and as a result 
boards become larger (Mak and Li, 2001). In addition, as the bank gets well established 
as a holding company the number of its subsidiaries may increase. This implies that more 
executive officers working within the subsidiaries join the board of directors of the 
holding company. BSIZE is therefore expected to be positively related to both LNCSIZE 
and AGE.  
             (5) 
.   SLHC AGE LNCSIZE
LEADER OUTDIR BLOCK INSOWN BSIZE
5 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
+ + + +
+ + + + =
ϕ ϕ ϕ




4.1. Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and Savings-and-Loan 
Holding Companies (SLHCs) available in the Research Insight database of Standard & 
Poor’s, in 2002. The following criteria have been applied to select the final sample: 
1. The company has total assets of at least $1,000 millions at fiscal year end 2002. 
2. Market return on common stock of the company must be reported in the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for at least twelve months as of year end 
2001.  
3. Annual proxy statements for the fiscal year 2002 must be available on the Securities 
and Exchange Commission website. 
In Research Insight there were a total of 287 BHCs and S&LHCs with total assets of 
more than $1,000 millions. Complete data were available for 260 companies. Data for the 
final sample (260 companies) are obtained from four sources: 
1.  Accounting data for the fiscal year 2002 are from Research Insight.  
2.  Stock market data are from the CRSP database. 
3.  Ownership and board data are collected from the annual proxy statements 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at the beginning of the 2002 
fiscal year.  
4.  Data on capital structure are collected from annual reports 10-K, available 
on the SEC website. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the selection of the final sample.  
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Companies in Research Insight with at 
least $1,000 millions of total assets in 
2002. 
287 companies 
less   
Companies with less than one year of stock 
returns in CRSP.  
12 companies 
less   
Companies with no annual proxy 







Fig. 1. Sample selection. 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
  
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study of the 
relation between ownership structure, board structure and performance. The average 
equity ownership by insiders (officers and directors) is 14.12  % (median: 9.55  %). 
Blockholder ownership has an average of 7.97 %. The typical bank in the sample has 12 
directors, among whom 83.33 % are outsiders (not employed by the company), has 17 
directors and top-executive officers, and has a CEO who is also chairman of the board. 
The typical bank has been operating as a holding company for the last 18 years, and its 
CEO has held his position for the last 7 years. The average bank in the sample has total 
assets of $21.24 billions (median: $3.12 billions). Average Tobin’s Q is 1.07 (median: 
1.07). Average tier 1 leverage ratio is 8.33 % (median: 7.92 %), and average standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns in 2002 is 7.44 % (median: 6.9 %). The risk of the 
typical bank, as measured by the standard deviation of the monthly stock return over the 
last 60 months, is equal to 8.75 %, and the median monthly stock return over the last two 
years is equal to 1.87 %. Savings-and-loan holding companies represent 25.7 % of the 
total sample. Finally, banks listed on the New York Stock Exchange represent 23.4 % of 
the total sample.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
5.1. The relationships among the governance mechanisms 
 
To examine the relationships among the governance mechanisms, we estimate Eqs. 
(1)-(5) as a system of linear equations using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Each 
governance mechanism appears on the left-hand side of one equation and the right-hand 
side of each of the others. Results of the 2SLS estimation are presented in table 3.   
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
  12  Table 3 shows that there is an interesting pattern of interdependence among several 
of the governance mechanisms, which is in favor of the substitution hypothesis
6. For Eq. 
(1) relating to insider ownership, the signs on the other ownership and board variables is 
generally consistent with these mechanisms being substitutes. However, none of the 
coefficient estimates is statistically significant. The results for Eq. (2) relating to 
blockholder ownership are similar to those for insider ownership, with none of the 
variables being significant. The weak findings for insider and blockholder ownership are 
consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Mak and Li (2001) but conflict with those 
of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Schranz (1993). 
 
The results for Eq. (3) suggest that the proportion of outside directors on the board 
decreases with the increase in insider ownership (p<0.01), and the decrease in board size 
(p<0.01). The relationship between managerial ownership and outside directors is 
consistent with these governance mechanisms being substitutes. Banks with high levels 
of insider ownership have less agency problems between managers and shareholders, and 
therefore have less need for monitoring by outside directors. However, another 
interpretation is that an increase in insider ownership increases the ability to influence 
board appointments, thereby reducing the presence of outside directors. Since smaller 
boards are considered as better monitors for managers (Jensen, 1993), the presence of 
more outside directors on larger boards may be interpreted as evidence that when the 
board gets larger, there is more need for outside directors. If banks “believe” that outside 
directors are better for monitoring managers, they will compensate for the lack of 
monitoring by larger boards by increasing the proportion of outside directors.  
 
For the board leadership structure (Eq. (4)), the results suggest that the presence of 
a dual leadership structure is negatively associated with higher levels of insider 
ownership (p<0.01) and positively related to longer CEO tenure (p<0.1). The negative 
association between insider ownership and dual board leadership indicates that the 
probability of the CEO being also the chairman of the board decreases with increasing 
equity ownership by officers and directors. This may be seen as a sign of good 
governance in banks with high levels of insider equity ownership. In these banks insiders 
have more interest in good governance and they require the separation of the two 
positions (CEO and board chairmanship). The finding that CEOs with longer tenure are 
more likely to hold the title of chairman is consistent with Brickley et al. (1997) who 
argue that dual leadership is a consequence of the “passing the baton” process in 
managerial succession. Finally, the results for Eq. (5) indicate that banks with more 
insider ownership (p<0.1) and more outside directors (p<0.01) have larger boards. Again, 
if larger boards are considered as ineffective in monitoring managers, this suggests that 
the lack of monitoring due to higher board size is compensated by the presence of 




                                                 
6 In table 3, the coefficients on the exogenous variables generally have the predicted sign but are often 
statistically insignificant. As a result, coefficient estimates for the endogenous governance variables may be 
imprecise.  
  13  5.2. Corporate governance and bank performance 
 
In this section we test the hypothesis of the optimal use of governance mechanisms 
by banks. In section 2 we argued that governance mechanisms are used by firms in a way 
that maximizes their performance. The optimal level of use of each mechanism varies 
from one firm to another depending on a number of factors related to the firm itself as 
well as to its business environment. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Mak and Li (2001) 
find that once the empirical analysis takes into account the endogeneity of corporate 
governance mechanisms, there is no effect of individual corporate governance 
mechanisms on performance. In this section, we conduct a similar analysis to Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) and Mak and Li (2001), by estimating OLS and 2SLS regressions of 
bank performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, on various corporate governance variables. 
This analysis is attempted to provide further evidence on whether corporate governance 
mechanisms in banking companies are endogenously determined, and therefore have no 
effect on performance. Before allowing for the endogeneity of governance mechanisms, 
we first estimate regressions where bank performance depends upon only a single 
governance mechanism.  
 
Table 4 presents results from OLS estimations where Tobin’s Q is regressed on 
individual governance mechanisms along with other control variables. These variables 
include the capital structure, as measured by the tier 1 leverage ratio (CAPITAL), the 
uncertainty of cash flows, as measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
(STDEV), and a control for company size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets (LNCSIZE).  Table 5 presents OLS and 2SLS regression estimates of Tobin’s Q on 
the five governance mechanisms and control variables. The 2SLS regression is estimated 
by adding Eq. (6) to the system of Eqs. (1)-(5), including TOBINQ as an additional 
endogenous variable, and adding CAPITAL and STDEV to the set of instrumental 
variables. Therefore, the simultaneous equations system treats the five governance 
variables, as well as performance, as endogenous.  The performance equation is the 
following:  
 
    (6) 
.   SLHC   LNCSIZE      STDEV      CAPITAL  
BSIZE   LEADER   OUTDIR   BLOCK   INSOWN     TOBINQ
6 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
 
[Insert tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
Contrary to theory and expectations, the results of the OLS estimations, presented 
in tables 4 and 5, together show that greater insider and blockholder ownership lead to 
poor performance in banking companies. The results are consistent with less insider and 
blockholder ownership leading to better performance. But these results are also consistent 
with causality running the other way around. Poor firm performance may lead insiders 
and blockholders to reduce their equity ownership in the bank. The 2SLS estimation 
allows to address the issue of which way the relation runs in each case.  
 
 
  14  The regression reported in the second column of table 5 not only considers the 
presence of alternative corporate governance mechanisms but also accounts for their 
endogeneity. Comparing the 2SLS estimates with the OLS estimates in the first column, 
the coefficient estimates on insider ownership and blockholder ownership loose their 
statistical significance. Furthermore, the performance model becomes statistically 
insignificant (the p-value of the F test is equal to 0.73). We interpret this as evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis of optimal use of governance mechanisms by banks. When the 
regression analysis takes into account the endogeneity of the ownership and board 
structure in banks it reveals no statistically significant effect of these governance 
mechanisms on banking performance.  
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the interrelations of corporate ownership and board structure 
characteristics, and their effect on firm performance in a sample of bank and loan-and-
savings holding companies. We argued that since banking companies face the same 
external disciplining factors, such as the market for corporate control and the product 
market, if banks internal control mechanisms are determined in an optimal way, a 
carefully specified empirical analysis should reveal significant links between the different 
corporate control mechanisms designed to mitigate the scope for moral hazard behavior 
by managers, but no effect on firm performance.  We develop two hypotheses which are 
the substitution hypothesis and the optimal use of governance mechanisms hypothesis, 
and test them on a sample of 260 bank and loan-and-savings holding companies, in 2002. 
The substitution hypothesis states that banks substitute between the different governance 
mechanisms at their disposal, such as insider ownership, bolckholder ownership and the 
presence of outside directors. The optimal use of governance mechanisms hypothesis 
states that if the governance mechanisms are used in an optimal way, an empirical 
analysis should reveal no effect on performance. We use the Two Stage Least Squares 
approach and find evidence in favor of these two hypotheses.  
 
The results indicate that ownership and board structures are related to each other. In 
particular, we find that banks with higher equity ownership by managers and directors 
tend to have lower proportions of outside directors on their boards. Since outside 
directors and higher equity ownership by insiders are considered as mechanisms designed 
to reduce the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, this may be interpreted 
as evidence that a bank that relies heavily on one mechanism has lower need for the other 
one. Depending on the costs and benefits of each mechanism, a bank will choose either to 
have a higher representation of outside directors or to have an ownership structure in 
which managers and directors have high stakes.   The results indicate also that banks with 
higher insider ownership have a lower probability to have a CEO who is also the 
chairman of the board. Consistent with the “passing the baton” hypothesis suggested in 
earlier studies we find that CEOs with a longer tenure are more likely to hold the 
chairman title. The findings are also in favor of the optimal use of governance 
mechanisms hypothesis. In fact, an OLS regression of governance mechanisms reveals a 
negative and statistically significant effect of insider and blockholder ownership on bank 
performance. However, when the 2SLS procedure is used these statistically significant 
  15  effects disappear. Overall the results of this study show that corporate ownership and 
board structures of banking firms are inextricably linked and that banks use optimal 
levels of each governance mechanism. Models that consider single ownership or board 
characteristics, such as managerial ownership or the proportion of outside directors may 
therefore be misspecified.  
          
One of the limitations of this study is the possible omission of governance variables 
that may be relevant in the performance equation or with strong relations to other 
governance mechanisms. For instance, the extent to which some banking firms rely on 
subordinated debt may help them reduce agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, and possibly rely less on other governance mechanisms. Therefore, the 
system of equations may be misspecified. Corporate governance theory is, unfortunately, 
incomplete to help taking into account all relevant mechanisms, when estimating a 
system of equations of governance mechanisms. The findings of this study suggest 
possible trails for future research. For instance, replicating this study on firms from other 
regulated industries, such as airline companies, media companies, or insurance 
companies, may enhance the understanding of the interrelations between governance 
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Table 1 : variable description 
 
INSOWN   Percentage of equity owned by the company directors and top executive 
officers, including the CEO. 
BLOCK  Percentage of equity owned by persons and institutions that hold 5 % or 
more of the company’s equity. 
OUTDIR   The proportion of directors not currently employed by the company. It 
is calculated as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors.  
LEADER   A dummy variable that takes on 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and 0 otherwise.  
BSIZE (board size)  The number of directors sitting on the board at the shareholders’ annual 
meeting.  
TOBINQ  Tobin’s Q = (total assets book value – book value of common equity + 
market value of common equity)/ total assets book value.  
RISK  The standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a maximum of 60 
months and a minimum of 12 months, depending on data availability on 
CRSP.  
TENURE  The number of years the CEO has held his position within the company. 
CSIZE  Book value of total assets.  
LNCSIZE  Log (Book value of total assets). 
RETURN  The average monthly market return over the last 24 months. 
AGE  The age of the company measured as the number of years since the 
company’s organization as a holding company.  
NINS  Number of insiders reported in the annual proxy statements as owning 
equity of the company. 
CAPITAL  A measure of capital structure: the tier 1 leverage ratio collected from 
annual reports 10-K. 
STDEV  Standard deviation of monthly stock returns in 2002. 
SLHC  A dummy variable that takes on 1 for Savings and Loan Holding 
Companies and 0 for Bank Holding Companies.  
NYSE  A dummy variable that takes on 1 for banks listed on the New York 
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Table 2 : Descriptive statistics (sample size = 260) 
 
Variables Min  Median  Mean  Max  Std.  Dev 
Insider Ownership (INSOWN %)  0  9.55  14.127  79.38  13.712 
Blockholder ownership (BLOCK %)  0 0 7.973  80.44  13.623 
Proportion of outside  
directors (OUTDIR %) 
50.000 83.333 80.825  95.833 10.057 
Leadership structure (LEADER)
a    0 -  0.55  1 - 
Board size (BSIZE)  4  12  12.32  31  4.428 
Company risk (RISK %)  4.908  8.754  9.314  35.622  2.783 
Average past return (RETURN %)   -5.003  1.869  1.818  6.609  1.295 
Company size (CSIZE) 
 in millions of U.S $  
1,005.32 3,125.21 21,243.92 758,800  75,036 
Log  of Company size (LNCSIZE)  6.913  8.047  8.475  13.539  1.384 
Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ)  0.9  1.069  1.073  1.313  0.053 
CEO tenure (TENURE)  1  7  9.15  42  7.164 
Company Age (AGE)  2  18  18.511  53  10.562 
Capital structure (CAPITAL %)  5.1  7.92  8.33  34.4  2.403 
Volatility of monthly stock returns 
 in 2002 (STDEV %) 
2.660 6.961 7.446  31.743  3.202 
Number of insiders (NINS)  5  17  18.234  41  6.34 
NYSE
 a  0 -  0.234  1 - 
SHLC
 a  0 -  0.257  1 - 
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Table 3 : Results of 2SLS regression of ownership and board structure (sample size = 260).  
t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the (1 %)***, (5 %)**, and 
(10 %)* levels.   
 
  Dependent variable 
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AGE      -0.034 
(-0.25) 
NYSE   3.400 
(0.31) 

































  21  Table 4 : Coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on individual governance 
mechanisms (sample size = 260).  
t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the (1  %)***, (5  %)**, and 
(10 %)* levels.  
 
Independent 













    
BLOCK   -0.0002 
(-1.19) 
   
OUTDIR    0.00005 
(0.18) 
  
LEADER     0.0042 
(0.66) 
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Table 5 : Coefficient Estimates from OLS and 2SLS Regressions of Tobin’s Q on 
governance mechanisms (sample size = 260).   
t-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the (1  %)***, (5  %)**, and 
(10 %)* levels.   
 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 










































2 0.167  -0.011 
F-statistic 
(p-value) 
6.78 
(0.000) 
0.67 
(0.738) 
 
 
 
 